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PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Alvan Brody*
The constitutional rights of persons charged with crime
formed a significant part of the decisions of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court on constitutional law matters during the 1960-1961
term.
A. Voluntariness of Confessions, Louisiana Constitution of
1921, Article I, Section 11- What Constitutes Improper
Threat?
In one case, State v. Ferguson,' the court backtracked from
what it called the "extended concept of involuntariness of con-
fessions" of State v. Ross.2 In the Ross case the statement by
an officer to the accused who was under arrest that "the best
thing to do is to tell the truth because we have the evidence
against you" was held a threat sufficient to vitiate the confes-
sion thereby obtained. In the Ferguson case, the statement by
a deputy sheriff to the accused, that he had better tell the truth
because "we have evidence that you were seen leaving your
home with [the victim]," was held not to constitute such a
threat. It is difficult completely to reconcile the two cases, for
logically a statement that the police have "the evidence" against
an accused is not substantially more or less threatening, nor
its effect upon an accused substantially different from a state-
ment indicating to the accused that the police have important
incriminating evidence against him. The Ferguson case rightly
allows an interrogating officer to exhort an accused to tell the
truth by indicating to him what evidence the police have linking
him to the crime, a usual technique of interrogation. The Ross
case can be distinguished in that it involved an exhortation
which indicated to the accused that the police had "the evidence"
of an unspecified sort, presumably in an amount sufficient to
convict the accused; whereas in Ferguson the statement speci-
fied one particular item of incriminating evidence, apparently
not sufficient to convict. However, the quantity and specificity
of the evidence alleged to the accused to be known by the police
have little relation to the character of the exhortation as a
*Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 240 La. 593, 124 So.2d 558 (1960).
2. 212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842 (1947).
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threat. Indeed, an assertion that the police have an item of
particularly incriminating evidence may be more threatening
to the accused than a vague assertion that the police have "the
evidence." After the Ferguson case, the authority of State v.
Ross must be considered as seriously impaired.
B. Privilege Against Self-Incrimiation, Louisiana Constitution
of 1921, Article I, Section 11 - Testimony Before Grand
Jury
In another case, State v. Smalling,8 the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of a trial court which quashed a
bill of information charging the defendant with various counts
of theft and public bribery on the ground that the information
had been grounded in whole or in part upon evidence secured
by a grand jury in violation of the defendant's constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The relevant section of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1921, Article I, Section 11, provides
that "no person shall be compelled to give evidence against him-
self in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject
him to criminal prosecution, except as otherwise provided in
this Constitution." One exception is designated by Article XIX,
Section 13, of the Constitution. By its terms "any person may
be compelled to testify.., against any one who may be charged
with . . . the offense of bribery and shall not be permitted to
withhold his testimony upon the ground that it may incriminate
him... but such testimony shall not afterwards be used against
him." (Emphasis added.) This district attorney had argued
that because the phrase in Article XIX, Section 13, "against
anyone" refers to testimony against someone other than the
witness himself, impliedly the immunity afforded by the Con-
stitution applies in bribery cases only where the witness testi-
fies "against another," and not when the witness testifies
against himself. The court rejects this argument, holding that
in bribery cases Article XIX, Section 13, does not by implica-
tion strip a witness of the immunity afforded by Article I, Sec-
tion 11, where his testimony incriminates himself rather than
someone else.
The defendant had testified before the grand jury on two
occasions within a period of a month. On the day of his first
appearance, and just prior to his testifying, he signed a waiver
3. 240 La. 887, 125 So.2d 399 (1960), (seven cases).
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of his immunity, voluntarily consenting "to testify before the
Grand Jury." His second appearance was not voluntary on his
part but was in response to a subpoena. Since, the court said,
there was no waiver of immunity with respect to his second
appearance and since part of the evidence forming the basis
of the information against him was secured during his second
appearance, the bill was held to be a nullity, as having been
secured in violation of defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. The court does not discuss the question of the
duration of the initial waiver. Although not in its terms ap-
plicable only to his first appearance, the court impliedly holds
it was inapplicable to his appearance at a later date despite the
fact that the subject matter of the later inquiry remained the
same.
C. Unconstitutional Statutory Vagueness
Two cases relate to the requisite specificity of definitions
of criminal offenses. In one, State v. Robertson,4 the court,
with two Justices dissenting, held unconstitutionally vague
R.S. 14:129 which made criminal the act of jury tampering,
which it defined as "any influencing of, or attempt to influence,
any petit juror in respect to his verdict," the court noting that
influencing "embraces all possible modes of influence. . . . [a]
newspaper article, a bribe, a gesture, a smile, a lifting of the
eyebrows." 5 The specific charges in the indictment against the
defendant, a deputy sheriff, included allegations that he had
stated in the presence of petit jurors who were in his charge
that a witness for the state in a criminal trial was not worthy
of belief, that certain evidence introduced by the prosecution
was not reliable, and that the jury's verdict would have little
effect, because the trial judge had committed reversible error,
and the Supreme Court would reverse the conviction in the
event they found the accused guilty.
In the other, State v. Roufa,6 the court, quoting with ap-
proval language in certain United States Supreme Court cases
that "all that is required is that the language [of the criminal
statute] conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
4. 241 La. 249, 128 So.2d 646 (1961).
5. 128 So.2d at 649. Compare Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 (1930).
6. 241 La. 474, 129 So.2d 743 (1961).
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practices," went on to uphold, against a charge of unconstitu-
tional vagueness, R.S. 14:106(2) which defines obscenity as the
intentional "production, sale, exhibition, possession with inten-
tion to display, exhibit, or sell ... any obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or sexually indecent print, picture, motion picture, writ-
ten composition, model, instrument, contrivance, or thing of
whatsoever description." It is difficult to discern why, unlike
obscenity which may be measured by common understanding of
that term, jury tampering may not be so measured, or why the
"influencing . . . any petit juror in respect to his verdict" is not
a sufficiently definite warning to intending violators of the pro-
scribed conduct. In any event the Supreme Court evidently
thought it expeditious to pass upon the constitutionality of the
tampering statute in a case where the indictment alleged conduct
clearly within the statutory prohibition. The formidable task of
redrafting the statute to characterize or enumerate species of
jury tampering now falls to the legislature.
Other Cases
In several unrelated cases, various constitutional provisions
were cited by the court, or invoked by litigants with varying
success. In Katz v. Singerman,8 which concerned a sectarian
religious dispute, the court notes that the "no establishment
of religion" clauses of the state and federal constitutions (Ar-
ticle I, Section 4, and the First Amendent respectively) buttress
the reluctance of state tribunals "to monitor the internal af-
fairs of religious bodies."9 In another, Randolph v. Village of
Turkey Creek,10 owners of a cafe where beer containing less than
three and two-tenths per cent alcohol by weight successfully
urged the unconstitutionality, as ultra vires, of a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the sale of such beer where a state stat-
ute" provides that such sale cannot be prohibited. In a third
case, Hays v. Hays,12 the constitutional attack failed. There
ingenious counsel for a divorced husband who had been ordered
by the court to pay alimony to his ex-wife, argued that since,
under Louisiana law, a termination of a marriage by divorce
dissolves the bonds of matrimony so that any alimony awarded
7. 129 So.2d at 747, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491
(1957).
8. 241 La. 103, 127 So.2d 515 (1961).
9. 127 So.2d at 524.
10. 240 La. 996, 126 So.2d 341 (1961).
11. LA. R.S. 26:588 (1950).
12. 240 La. 708, 124 So.2d 917 (1960).
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is a "gratuity in the nature of a pension," such an award is
an unconstitutional taking of the husband's property without
due process of law. The Supreme Court gave the contention
shorter shrift perhaps than its ingenuity warranted by point-
ing out that alimony is, of course, an obligation imposed by a
court under its authority to regulate and impose conditions upon
divorces, and is, alas, in no sense an unconstitutional taking.
